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Virtual Justice: The Flawed Prosecution of Crime in America. By H. Richard
Uviller.* New Haven: Yale University Press, 1996. Pp. xvii, 318. S30.00.
I
The acquittal of O.J. Simpson in 1995 for the murder of his former wife
and her friend touched off a new spate of criticisms of the American criminal
justice system.' Recently, anything short of conviction in high-profile cases
has tended to spark vociferous insistence that the acquittal or hung jury was
the result not of the defendant's factual innocence (or even reasonable doubt
thereof), but of the internal flaws of our criminal justice system.2 Meanwhile,
a number of books by well-known trial lawyers have confirmed what devotees
of television courtroom dramas and disgruntled observers of recent trials have
long suspected: that the criminal trial is a battle between lawyers in which each
side uses all the means at its disposal to attain victory, even at the cost of
obfuscating the truth The frustration with our supposedly flawed criminal
justice system can only be exacerbated by increasing concern over crime
rates. 
4
The twin perceptions, accurate or not, that crime is on the rise while our
ability to combat it through the legal system is declining give particular force
* Arthur Levitt Professor of Law, Columbia University School of Law.
1. See, e.g., Michael Lind, Jury Dismissed, in PosTrIoR'N't: THE OJ. SOIpSON CASE 155 (Jeffrey
Abramson ed., 1996); Respect for Justice System Slides, Poll Says. N.Y. T.IES. May 1. 1995. at B3. A cavil
jury found Simpson liable for wrongful death and battery. See Verdict. Rufo v. Simpson. No SC031947.
1997 WL 45143, at *2 (Cal. Super. Trans. Feb. 4, 1997).
2. See, e.g., ANNE STRICK, INJUSTICE FOR ALL 180 (1977) (cnticizng defense auomey's suppor of
adversary system in Patricia Hearst case); id. at 183 (criticizing use of jury selection experts in ral of Dr.
Samuel Sheppard); FRANKLIN STRIER, RECONSTRUC'ING JUsTICE: AN AGENDA FOR TRIAL REFOL.i I-6
(1994) (criticizing adversary tactics in Rodney King trial); id. at 27-28 (attacking same in Menendez
brothers' trial).
3. See, e.g., F. LEE BAILEY & HARVEY ARONSON, THE DEFENSE NEVER RESTS (1971). ROBERT L.
SHAPIRO & LARKIN WARREN, THE SEARCH FOR JusTICE: A DEFENSE ATTORNEY'S BRIEF ON THE O
SIMPSON CASE (1996).
4. See Lori Montgomery, Crime at a Distance: Thats the Top Concern: Poll Confirms that Fear of
Crime Is Out of Proportion with Most People's Reality, AUSTIN A.-SrATEsM1AR. Feb 4. 1996. at D6
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to H. Richard Uviller's new book, Virtual Justice: The Flawed Prosecution of
Crime in America. The book offers an admirably well-balanced critique of the
criminal justice system, breaking away from the mold of antidefense diatribe
by offering sophisticated arguments that our rules of evidence and procedure
make it difficult to reach the truth. The author also proposes creative ways
to reconcile the demands of the Bill of Rights with the needs of police officers
and potential victims. Often, these innovative solutions make use of modem
technology, such as a radio hookup that would allow for speedy issuance of
constitutionally required search warrants to police officers in the field (pp.
84-87). The organization of the book tracks the criminal process from the
initial investigatory stages to arrest, jury selection, and final disposition. On a
more microscopic level, Uviller begins each chapter-which can be read as an
essay unto itself, although the substantive quality varies widely-with a
fictional account that sharpens the issues that he discusses.
II
Uviller devotes substantial space to a critique of aspects of the adversarial
system, which he asserts inhibits the discovery of truth during all the stages of
a criminal investigation and trial.6 For example, he reads Miranda v. Arizona7
as an attempt to extend the principle of the adversary system that "a suspect
is never regarded as a primary source of evidence" to the essentially
inquisitorial procedure of stationhouse interrogation (p. 122). Recognizing that
Miranda tends to equalize poor defendants with their wealthier and more
educated counterparts, Uviller nevertheless warns that taking it too far will
eliminate evidence necessary to prove factual guilt (pp. 130-31). Uviller also
questions the wisdom of Massiah v. United States,' charging that its ban on
deliberate elicitation of incriminating evidence from an accused in the absence
of counsel was made by a Court "wedded to the adversary ideal" (pp.
299-300).
At trial, the ill effects of the adversary system are even more apparent.
Uviller argues that the conception of law as sport is responsible for the
stereotypical defense attorney excesses now familiar to the citizenry through
media trial coverage (p. 156).9 He finds the passivity of the adversary
system's judge and jury even more troubling. He argues for simpler evidentiary
5. For an example of a less scholarly critique of criminal justice, see JUDGE HAROLD J. ROTHWAX,
GUILTY: THE COLLAPSE OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE (1996).
6. See, e.g., MARVIN E. FRANKEL, PARTISAN JUSTICE 87-100 (1980).
7. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
8. 377 U.S. 201 (1964).
9. Other commentators have recognized that the adversary system tends to conceive of the lawyer's
role as that of champion and warrior, thereby enforcing the adversary ethic. See, e.g., Elizabeth G.
Thornburg, Metaphors Matter: How Images of Battle, Sports, and Sex Shape the Adversary System, 10 WiS.
WOMEN'S LJ. 225 (1995).
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rules that place more discretion in the hands of the trial judge (p. 240). He also
contends that the adversary system makes it hard for jurors to discern the truth
(pp. 251-65). Jurors' difficulty in evaluating the plausibility of testimonial
evidence is exacerbated by the structured manner in which such testimony is
presented in the adversary system. Uviller's solution to the problem of finding
truth amid this confusion is revealed in the final chapter, where he suggests as
alternative to the adversarial system a quasi-inquisitorial model allowing the
judge to supervise the investigation, to direct courtroom case presentation, and
to participate in factfinding (p. 304). Combined with "some adversary
elements-such as vigorous confrontation and diligent adverse counsel" (p.
294), the new system could provide more accurate factfinding while also
protecting the rights of the accused (p. 293).
111
The shadow behind Virtual Justice is "true justice" (p. xiv), a term Uviller
never precisely defines. He apparently uses it to mean accurate factfinding,
assuming that "historic reality" (p. xiv) is necessarily identical to justice. But
the concept of justice may include dignitary values, and the subjects of
criminal investigation are not merely means to an end. Uviller generally claims
to prefer literal to virtual justice, but he at times appears to reverse this
preference: He says tantalizingly that plea bargaining is, in his view,
constitutionally questionable but that case pressure requires it"° and that the
"virtual justice" of plea bargaining "works better than the authentic model" (p.
199). What then is true justice if virtual justice may "'work better"? For all the
complaints Uviller makes about "virtual justice" replacing "literal justice," he
does not fully explore what true justice is and whether it is attainable within
the structure of law.
While Uviller seeks to assure his reader that his substantive proposals fit
within the legal framework set up by Supreme Court decisions, he sometimes
glosses over the question of whether the reasons behind these rulings lie solely
in the search for factual accuracy. Occasionally, Uviller appears to
acknowledge that the principles on which the decisions stand should take
precedence over the potential aids to truthfinding that would be preferable
under his analysis." Yet while proposing reform of the adversary system, he
10. The thesis that case pressure drives plea bargaining is not universally accepted. See, e.g.. MILTON
HEUMANN, ADAPTING TO PLEA BARGAINING: THE EXPERIENCE OF PROSECUTORS. JUDGES. AND DEFMNSE
ATTORNEYS 32 (1978).
11. For example, although he criticizes the exclusionary rule as a confusing and overly complicated
bar to truthfinding, Uviller also recognizes that the right of the ciuzenry to be secure from unreasonable
searches and seizures demands respect. He therefore proposes to facilitate the acquisition of a warrant
before a search, rather than to do away with the warrant rule altogether (pp. 24-26)
19971 1955
The Yale Law Journal [Vol. 106: 1953
accepts without question that its unique goal is to get at the facts. 2
As a result, Uviller follows a modem trend that tends to view factual
accuracy as the overwhelming goal of criminal procedure, a view that can be
described in his own parlance as equating "literal" with "justice."" Procedural
safeguards arguably protect dignitary rights by ensuring that the defendant can
help determine his own fate: that he is not adjudged guilty by an impersonal
system. The danger of a nonadversarial system is the bureaucratization of
adjudication, whose most extreme manifestation is a Kafkaesque world in
which citizens unable to participate in the making of their own fate are
summarily executed by bland bureaucrats. t4
The antidote to this dystopia is a principle of due process that mandates
the provision of reasons. 5 The dignitary rights protected by the adversary
system allow the defendant to participate in determining his own fate. If he
chooses not to speak in his own defense, he cannot be forced to do so. He
retains the opportunity to confront the witnesses against him, even if the cause
of factual accuracy would be better served by having the judge investigate the
credibility of the witnesses. Certainly these rights can be waived, as when the
defendant chooses to plead guilty; otherwise, the state would be depriving him
of the ability to direct his own defense. But for these rights to retain any
viability, the defendant must have the opportunity to participate in his own
trial.
12. Mirjan Damagka has suggested that nonadversarial systems of adjudication work to implement state
policy while the adversary system serves to resolve conflict. See MIRJAN R. DAMASKA, THE FACES OF
JUSTICE AND STATE AUTHORITY 88 (1986). The two systems are thus not true alternatives for achieving
the same prime objective. See STRIER, supra note 2, at 211. Louis Seidman has pointed out that criminal
procedure must be evaluated in the context of substantive criminal law goals. See Louis Michael Seidman,
Factual Guilt and the Burger Court: An Examination of Continuity and Change in Criminal Procedure,
80 COLUM. L. REv. 436, 437 (1980) (arguing that Burger Court's ostensible insistence on accurate factual
determinations of guilt mask continuing "use [of] the criminal justice system as a tool for social
engineering, even when this pursuit of broad social goals conflicts with the need to reach factually reliable
judgments in reliable cases"). In other words, before Uviller articulates his preference for a less adversarial
adjudicatory model, he needs to provide a theory of the substantive goal.
13. See Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 307-08 (1991) (subjecting admission at trial of
involuntary confession to harmless-error analysis). The Court noted that the harmless error is "'essential
to preserve the principle that the central purpose of a criminal trial is to decide the factual question of the
defendant's guilt or innocence."' Id. at 308 (quoting Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 681 (1986)).
The dissent argued that the admission of a coerced confession violated due process "without regard for the
truth or falsity of the confession ... and even though there is ample evidence aside from the confession
to support the conviction." Id. at 288; see also Akhil Reed Amar & Rente B. Lettow, Fifth Amendment
First Principles: The Self-Incrimination Clause, 93 MicH. L. REV. 857, 889-95 (1995); Eric L. Muller,
Solving the Batson Paradox: Harmless Error, Jury Representation, and the Sixth Amendment, 106 YALE
L.J. 93, 107-16 (1996). While much in criminal procedure has become constitutionalized, see Gordon Van
Kessel, Adversary Excesses in the American Criminal Trial, 67 NOTRE DAME L. REV, 403, 487-501
(1992), courts are increasingly willing to find that breaches of these constitutional imperatives constitute
only harmless error, see Charles J. Ogletree, Jr., Arizona v. Fulminante: The Harm of Applying Harmless
Error to Coerced Confessions, 105 HARV. L. REv. 152, 152-53, 156 (1991); Tom Stacy & Kim Dayton,
Rethinking Harmless Constitutional Error, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 79, 86-88 (1988).
14. See FRANZ KAFKA, THE TRIAL 228-29 (,Villa & Edwin Muir trans., Schocken Books 1984)
(1925).
15. See JERRY L. MAsHAW, DuE PROCESS IN THE ADMINISTRATIVE STATE 177-80 (1985).
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It is, of course, all too easy to fall into the circular argument that anything
less than the protections we currently have would undermine the dignity of the
individual. Uviller may assume that such constitutionally protected aspects of
criminal procedure exist simply to promote the truthfinding function of the
judicial process.' 6 Although it is clear that the Framers regarded the
safeguards enumerated in the Fifth and Sixth Amendments as important rights,
this does not explain why they are rights. Is it because they promote truth, and
it would be inherently unfair to impose criminal sanctions against a defendant
whose guilt was determined through methods subject to a high probability of
factual inaccuracy, or because they are inherently dignitary rights? Although
Uviller recognizes these tensions, he does not explore them fully.
Nor does Uviller explain how his reforms would fit into a system
delivering true justice. He proposes that adversary elements such as "vigorous
confrontation and diligent adverse counsel" (p. 294) would prevent the
inquisitorial system from trampling the rights of defendants in a politically
volatile case, but it is hard to imagine a system featuring vigorous
confrontation and diligent adverse counsel that would not conflict with the
judge-centered model that Uviller defends. Uviller assumes that these vestiges
of the adversary model are necessary only in politically volatile cases. He
views the values potentially trampled as only those of accurate factfinding.
Even if one assumes that the paramount goal of the criminal justice system
is factual accuracy, one must develop a more sophisticated definition of truth
before concluding that the adversary system impedes its discovery. 7 In his
earlier work, Uviller recognized a number of finer distinctions. Uviller's
insistence that the discovery of truth is the primary goal of the system ignores
a distinction that he himself has enunciated between instrumental and ultimate
truths.'8 Monroe Freedman has argued that to achieve one ultimate truth, the
acquittal of an innocent defendant, an attorney might have to undermine the
credibility of a witness he believes to be telling the instrumental truth.' 9 That
is, the lawyer might have to discredit truthful testimony because even honest
witnesses can give circumstantial evidence that could lead to the conviction of
an innocent defendant. Uviller himself once suggested that a lawyer's doing
16. See Amar & Lettow, supra note 13, at 922-24 (Trth is a preeminent crinunal procedure value
in the Bill of Rights."); Monroe H. Freedman, Judge Frankels Search for Truth. 123 U. PA. L REv. 1060.
1063 (1975) (discussing dual function of adversary system as serving interests of state both in discovenng
truth and in dignitary rights of individual); Tom Stacy, The Search for Truth in Consutiutonal Criminal
Procedure, 91 COLUM. L. REv. 1369, 1376-77, 1380-81 (1991) (noting that Self-Incriminaton and Double
Jeopardy Clauses may be understood both as "truth-furthering" devices and as "-uth-imparing- digmtary
guarantees).
17. For discussion of possible refinements, see Mirgan Damagka. Presentanon of Evidence and
Facfinding Precision, 123 U. PA. L. REV. 1083, 1103-04 (1975); and Stephen A. Saltzburg. The
Unnecessarily Expanding Role of the American Trial Judge. 64 VA. L REV. 1. 11-13 (1978).
18. See H. Richard Uviller, The Advocate, the Truth. and Judicial Hackles: A Reaction to Judge
Frankel's Idea, 123 U. PA. L. REv. 1067, 1077-79 (1975).
19. See Monroe H. Freedman, Professional Responsibilir of the Cnrmnal Defense Laiv.er, 64 MIcHq.
L. REv. 1469, 1474-75 (1966).
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so would be acceptable.20 In an adversary process, it is much more likely that
instrumental truths might be made to appear false in order to promote the
ultimate truth; in the inquisitorial trial, where the judge asks most of the
questions, the ultimate truth may be subordinated to instrumental truths.
Uviller also neglects the argument that not all factual inaccuracies are
equal. For example, many people believe that a false conviction is considerably
worse than a false acquittal.2 ' Assuming an imperfect world in which both
mistakes occasionally will be made, the goal would then become to ensure not
only that false convictions are rarer than false acquittals but also that an
optimal proportion between the two errors is produced. The characteristics of
the adversary system that Uviller sees as impeding truth may serve to maintain
this desirable relationship. 22 Of course, Uviller might respond that the
adversary system strikes the wrong balance between the two types of mistakes.
This response might require adjustment of the procedural law, but in general
the adversary system is more successful than the inquisitorial system in making
sure that false acquittals greatly outnumber false convictions.
Uviller's book presents us with the intriguing suggestion that we can
achieve "literal justice" if only we have the resolve to reject "virtual justice."
Rather than showing what literal justice is and how it is attainable, however,
the book demonstrates that literal justice, at least as conceived by the author,
simply does not exist. Here the title of Uviller's book becomes richly ironic:
The term "virtual," in the jargon of late twentieth-century technology, refers
to an illusion so perfect that it is indistinguishable from reality.23 Similarly,
the virtual justice that Uviller portrays may be the closest we can get to literal
justice-and as he himself suggests, it often works better than literal justice.
In that sense, we might say that virtual justice is a goal we do not seek but
whose accomplishment we happily embrace.
-Jessie K. Lilt
20. See Uviller, supra note 18, at 1078.
21. See Kate Stith, The Risk of Legal Error in Criminal Cases: Some Consequences of the Asymmetry
in the Right to Appeal, 57 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 4 (1990) ("In the Anglo-American tradition, the social cost
of factual error against the defendant (a 'false positive') is deemed greater than the social cost of factual
error against the government (a 'false negative').").
22. Professor Tom Stacy points out that because no system can completely eliminate errors, any
conception of accuracy must also address how errors should be allocated. An innocence-weighted model
sees false convictions as worse than false acquittals, while a guilt-weighted model takes the opposite view.
A conception of accuracy must also decide the relative importance of error-avoidance and error-allocation;
for example, one might be willing to accept ten errors if only two of those are false convictions, but only
eight errors if four of those are false convictions. See Stacy, supra note 16, at 1406-07.
23. Cf. 19 OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 674 (J.A. Simpson & E.S.C. Weiner eds., 2d ed. 1989).
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